challenges, such as the time that had passed since the crimes took place and the precariousness of witnesses' memories. 7 Despite the presence of forum-neutral evidentiary challenges in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes, the discourse has thus far been controlled by the conceptual divide between the international and national tiers of criminal adjudication. This
Chapter suggests a change of methodological perspective. Focusing on the nature of the crime and keeping the domestic practitioner in mind, it raises the following interrelated questions. To what extent are the above-mentioned challenges inherent to the kind of court, i.e. forum-specific, and to what extent are they typical for the nature of international crimes?
To be able to answer this twofold query we must first explain what makes international crimes different. If international crimes are indeed distinguishable from 'regular' domestic crimes, and the difficulties faced at the international level are not forum-specific but crimespecific, then international criminal tribunals and domestic courts face similar evidentiary challenges. Solutions to these challenges developed by the international tribunals will also be a useful source of guidance for the investigative and prosecutorial endeavors at the national level. Such solutions may then be found in crime-focused analysis instead of through a sui generis approach to scrutinizing the law and practice of international criminal prosecutions.
Although some of the evidentiary challenges in investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating international crimes are universal and not forum-specific, the nature of such crimes could arguably serve as a harmonizing factor for procedures and practices utilized in this category of cases across the board. The idiosyncrasies of international criminality may operate as a constraint on the growing pluralism between international and national criminal procedure, at least in the cases involving international crimes.
In testing these ideas, this Chapter starts by discussing the idiosyncrasies of international crimes and the special challenges of investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating them, including the distinct goals typically associated with international criminal justice (section 2). It then continues by connecting these characteristics to the debate on evidentiary hurdles intrinsic to the investigation and prosecution of international crimes. Section 3 examines how those hurdles affect evidentiary processes, regardless of the forum-national or international-in which the crimes are prosecuted.
Goals of international criminal justice
Traditional goals of domestic criminal law usually include retribution for wrongdoing, general and individual deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 10 These naturally also play a role in relation to international crimes. Holding individual perpetrators accountable for crimes is generally thought to be the first and foremost objective that (international) criminal courts and tribunals pursue. 11 But international criminal justice is often said to have certain broader goals that go beyond the traditional confines of the regular domestic criminal trial. 12 Trials dealing with mass atrocities such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide serve greater purposes determinative of the future of the societies in which the international crimes were committed. 13 These goals include restoring international peace and security, fighting impunity, providing justice or 'closure' for victims, and recording history, 14 or in other words 'the objective of "educating" people of "historical truths" through law.' 15 The self-imposed goals of international criminal justice are plentiful, and scholars have raised questions as to whether international criminal institutions have enough strength to carry the weight of all of them. 16 At the same time, it may prove impossible to determine in any empirical sense how the objectives specific for international criminal justice play a role in the daily realities of international criminal courts and tribunals. 17 Still, it is possible to theorize about the potential influence of those special goals on evidentiary issues.
A. Fighting impunity
Ending impunity for international crimes by punishing the perpetrators is perhaps the most obvious objective of international criminal justice. 18 But this goal is only partially inherent to the nature of international crimes. As a slogan, 'fighting impunity' was launched at the international level and can be found, among others, in the preamble of the ICC Statute. [c]hoosing the subject matter by opportunistic criteria rather by the objective gravity and legal requirements may mislead the investigation and turn it into a plain fraud of law'; (2) suspect-driven as opposed to offencedriven investigations, which 'tends to develop a "target-oriented" inertia, a deliberate or unconscious assumption that the suspicion must be corroborated, rather than tested objectively'; and (3) an increased emphasis on the suffering of victims combined with a decreased emphasis on the role of the suspect. 21 Ibid. 356, 358-59. The idea that we can learn from the past leads to the assumption that recording history in criminal trials for the purpose of strengthening collective memory is a form of didacticism.
B. Restoring international peace and security
There is thus a connection between the goal of history-telling on the one hand, and the broader didactic aims of reinforcing collective memory, learning from the past, and propagating human rights principles on the other hand. For the purpose of this Chapter, they can be discussed jointly for the reason that they are likely to similarly affect the amount of information considered at trial. In order to explore whether and how these supposed objectives of international criminal justice affect evidentiary processes, it is useful to give an overview the debate on the history-telling purpose of trials. This may expose possible influences and tensions between that purpose and the evidentiary aspects.
Is history-telling to remain the concern of historians alone? Lawyers generally state that the primary goal of a criminal trial is to establish the truth in relation to the charges brought against the accused. conflicts that led to the crimes. 30 However, the goal of recording history in international criminal trials, or the idea that the 'process of subjecting evidence to forensic scrutiny will set down a permanent record of the crimes that will stand the test of time,' 31 has not gone without criticism.
There are roughly three schools of thought on the didactic goal of trials in cases involving international crimes. The first school of thought perceives the broader goal of history-telling as a legitimate (or even primary) objective of an international criminal trial.
This is known as didactic legality or didactic history. 32 The proponents of 'didactic legality', such as Lawrence Douglas and Mark Osiel, argue that there is room for undertaking education through history-telling in trials involving international crimes without undermining the legitimacy of the process. Douglas concedes that a criminal trial has the primary purpose of answering the guilt/innocence question, but he continues that it is not a trial's sole purpose: extralegal interests of collective instruction are amongst its valid functions. 33 Osiel emphasizes the importance of story-telling within the legal context for the creation of collective memory.
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The second school, known as liberal legalism, advocates the idea that a criminal trial should serve only one purpose, and that is to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. 35 One of this school of thought's more famous, and perhaps one of its first advocates is Hannah Arendt. In her well-known book, she states that '[t]he purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing else. Even the noblest of ulterior purposes … can only detract from the law's main business: to weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due punishment.' 36 Even though Attorney-General Hausner was aware of the difficulties of exposing the 'roots of the evil', during the Eichmann trial he still maintained that history was at the center of the proceedings: '[i]t is not an individual that is in the dock at this historic trial, and not the Nazi regime alone, but anti-Semitism throughout history'. observing that the didactic purpose pursued in the Eichmann trial led to breaches of due process rights. 38 Legal liberalism asserts that the sole function of a criminal trial is to determine whether the alleged crimes occurred and whether the accused can be held criminally responsible for them. When a court attempts to answer broader questions, such as why the underlying conflict occurred, or tries to resolve a clash of competing historical interpretations, it undermines due process, which ultimately damages the credibility of the legal system as a whole.
Douglas nuances the assertion stated by legal liberalists that setting history-telling as a goal in a criminal trial will automatically violate the rights of the accused. As he puts it, ' [t]o succeed as a didactic spectacle in a democracy, a trial must be justly conducted insofar as one of the principal pedagogic aims of such a proceeding must be to make visible and public the sober authority of the rule of law.' 39 In other words, these trials must be fair or else they would not be successful in getting the lessons they are meant to convey across to the general public. A blatantly unfair trial is not a convincing teacher. Douglas also notes that some legal liberalists express a related view, namely that it is not so much inappropriate for courts to try to write history, nor will the rights of the accused necessarily be violated if they pursue the history-writing objective; however, courts will inevitably fail in any attempt to do so. 40 Judges may not have the capacity to produce a nuanced picture of events, since they function under time constraints and are bound by considerations of legal relevancy. 41 From the perspective of the historian, judge-painted historical pictures will seem 'fragmentary, foreshortened, and locked in an arbitrary time frame'. 42 Osiel notes this stance, too, and observes that '[t]he prevailing opinion is now that the attempt to combine the two endeavors is very likely to produce poor justice or poor history, probably both.'
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The judges in the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem were cognizant of their shortcomings as historians. They articulated the third school of thought, which is closely related to the second school of thought but milder in its articulation: the by-product doctrine. In their judgment differentiating effect because the amount of information relevant to the case increases as does the amount of elements that need to be proven.
What to prove
The goal of didactic history-telling may influence the scope of the truth-finding process, but substantive criminal law norms govern it in the most direct sense, serving as restrictions on the search for the truth. as they increase the number of crime ingredients that need to be proven, and consequently, the amount of direct and indirect evidence that will be presented. The contextual elements also pose additional evidentiary challenges. Next to certain other peculiar requirements of international crime definitions, e.g. the special intent for the crime of genocide, such elements are in fact most difficult to establish. 64 They therefore enhance the complexity and magnitude of the process of gathering and presenting evidence.
A. Crimes of context

B. Modes of liability
A typical characteristic of international crimes prosecutions is the distinction between crime base evidence and linkage evidence. 65 In a conventional criminal case, the starting point for police investigators is the occurrence of a crime, after which a suspect will be sought. But in international crime cases, courts and tribunals, whether national or international, are often faced with a reversal of this sequence. Certain suspects will have already been identified, 63 Order after which the individual crimes and the suspects' connection to them will be investigated.
The identified suspect is linked to the crime, the occurrence of which is known through open source materials such as NGO reports, news articles, and social media, instead of identifying the suspect based on his or her putative link to the crime.
Linking the crime(s) to the alleged perpetrator remains one of the biggest challenges in international criminal justice. Yet, linkage evidence is more determinative for the decision on individual criminal responsibility and for the outcome of the case than crime base evidence, which may be less disputed at trial. 66 Since prosecutions focus on the most responsible perpetrators that are generally far removed from the actual crime scene, investigators and prosecutors dedicate a considerable amount of their effort to unearthing linkage evidence. Moreover, these perpetrators are not only far removed, but they also hardly ever act alone. With the political and historical context being an element of international crime definitions, individualization inevitably comes under a certain amount of pressure.
Koskenniemi goes even further, stating that 'in the end, individualisation is … impossible'.
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There is always the danger that establishing the connection between the accused and the crime would be drawn through 'broad interpretations and assumptions about the political and administrative culture.' 
How to Prove
As Damaška pointed out, in the previous century we have 'witnessed not only the growing uncertainty about the concept of objective truth, but also the realization of the fallibility of our fact-finding methods, particularly when human behavior is the object of investigation.'
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In the international criminal justice discourse, a similar observation may be made. In addition to the legal linkage problems discussed above, factually linking the (intellectual) perpetrator to the atrocity is often difficult when prosecuting and adjudicating international crimes. As cautiousness is all the more relevant since this case concerns events in … a country which was torn by deep political and ethnic differences and an armed conflict as a result of all this.' 78 Criminal courts dealing with old core crimes cases will encounter these problems to a great extent, as has also been noted, for instance, with respect to the ECCC.
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There is often some amount of delay when investigating and prosecuting international crimes. Whether it be a time lapse of 20, 30, 50, or only a few years, this can cause problems with finding and preserving evidence, and dealing with the fading memories of witnesses.
But also newer cases will suffer from the problem that witnesses have been through an extremely traumatic experience, trauma being a factor diminishing the factual accuracy of witness recollections, and will have told their stories on several previous occasions, for instance to journalists, NGO workers, and members of UN commissions of inquiry. One can think of domestic cases where the level of traumatization is similarly grave, such as sexual crimes cases, but in those instances it is unlikely that the victim witness will have told their 75 See Combs (n 2) 12 ('the vast bulk of the evidence presented to the current international tribunals comes in the form of witness testimony.'). story repeatedly to other (non-judicial) fact-finders. The ICC, conversely, does encounter this problem, as nowadays journalists and human rights researchers are generally at the crime scene before the Court starts its investigation, and these non-judicial fact-finders will have talked to potential witnesses before the Court's investigators get the opportunity to do so. Given the poor quality of the available evidence, the increase in the amount of information and evidence that potentially comes under consideration by the court is 80 There are a number of comprehensive scholarly projects dealing with this subject, for instance the inevitable. Scale and quantity are more than bare numbers, as in quantity itself lie problems.
This section draws a link between the features of international crimes discussed above and evidentiary challenges. It does so by examining the following hypothesis: the quantity of information affects the quality of evidence, and eventually, could affect the law governing the admission and presentation of evidence. Measures that are designed to reduce the quantity of evidence in international crimes cases, in particular taking judicial notice of adjudicated facts and facts of common knowledge, will therefore be discussed.
On scope and quantity
As noted previously, the didactic purpose of history-telling may entail a significant increase in the amount of information considered legally relevant to a particular case. Didactic legalism is likely to welcome the expansion of the scope of (supposedly) relevant evidence as it allows for the educational value of the trial to take center stage. However, this also means that the larger historical context, including parts of it that are outside the scope of the acts of the accused or the strict crime definition, becomes the subject of truth-finding at trial. This can be problematic on two levels. First, when a criminal trial concerns larger historical and political events, it will necessarily involve an interpretation of that context. The interpretation of the context is exactly the thing that is disputed in relation to the individual acts of the accused, which is the subject of the trial. 83 Consider, however, the following example to convey an unambiguous historical "truth" to its audience, the trial will have to silence the accused. But in such case, it ends up as a show trial. In order for the trial to be legitimate, the accused must be entitled to speak. But in that case, he will be able to challenge the version of 83 Koskenniemi (n 1516. 84 Ibid., 16-7. under scrutiny even further, may put additional pressure on the principle of individual criminal responsibility.
It can therefore be disputed whether setting additional objectives in international crimes cases is desirable at the micro (trial) level. Insofar as the context is part of the crime definition, an increase in the amount of evidence is unavoidable but perhaps only to that extent legitimate. Quantity may lead to quality on the one hand, but it can also lead to evidence debris and other unwanted side-effects on the other hand. For instance, quality may improve where the fact that requires proof is of a quantitative nature. When trying to demonstrate that an armed attack was in fact widespread, having a plurality of witnesses that can testify to incidents that help corroborate that element of a crime against humanity affects the strength of the case in a positive way. However, where quantity leads to so much evidence that it clogs up the system and creates unmanageable trials, the quality of the proceedings as a whole may be affected negatively. Scrutinizing large quantities of evidence becomes difficult and time-consuming for all parties involved and may create ambiguity as to the scope of the case, potentially infringing upon the accused's right to be tried without undue delay and to be notified of the charged against him or her.
Enhancing judicial economy
When discussing the quantity of evidence and what needs to be proven, it is also important to note what does not need proof. Not all of the material facts need to be proven at the international criminal tribunals, and that may solve part of the quantity problem. Broader solutions such as judges' managerial powers and negotiated justice aside, two evidentiary rules come to mind that are intended to stimulate judicial economy, and which allow a court to consider a fact established without requiring evidence to prove its existence: first, agreed facts, and second, judicial notice of facts of common knowledge and adjudicated facts. on the willingness of the parties to agree on them the amount of agreed facts is usually marginal in practice. 93 Judicial notice is a tool that allows a court to take certain facts as proven without hearing evidence. Rule 94 of the ICTY and ICTR RPE states that the court may take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge (or 'notorious' facts), adjudicated facts, and of the authenticity of documentary evidence (such as UN documentation). 94 The rule originated in the common law, but can also be found in civil law systems. 95 97 something that was also followed by the Dutch court in Basebya.
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The rationale behind rules of judicial notice is to speed up trials by not devoting time to proving issues that are blatantly obvious, and to enhance consistency in factual findings between various chambers. so indirectly. 101 It has been suggested that the matter should not be a balance between equally fundamental interests, but a protection of the fundamental right to a fair trial while improving judicial economy. 102 Furthermore, it can be disputed whether dispensing with the need for formal proof truly speeds up trials. While the Court is obliged to judicially notice facts of common knowledge, adjudicated facts or the authenticity of documentary evidence may be judicially noticed at the request of a party, after hearing the parties. 103 This implies an obligation on the opposing party to dispute the accuracy of the suggested facts. 104 Having to respond to long lists of facts offered for notice by the prosecution places a significant burden on the defence.
As one ICTY Trial Chamber recognized, 'since the admission of an adjudicated fact only creates a presumption as to its accuracy, the admission may consume considerable time and resources during the course of the proceedings, thereby frustrating, in practice, the implementation of the principle of judicial economy.' 105 While in theory a valuable tool for restricting the quantity of evidence, taking judicial notice of certain facts should not be overestimated as a practical solution. Unfortunately, the same can be said of agreed facts; in reality, parties are not likely to reach such agreements often. If these rules are to decrease evidence quantity in relation to international crimes across the international-national boundary, additional mechanisms need to be developed to remedy their practical shortcomings.
Concluding Remarks
This Chapter shows that certain typical features of international crimes set these crimes apart from ordinary crimes. Such features lead to an exponential increase of information that must be considered and managed at all stages of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. The amount of information can help prove the relevant fact where, due to subpar quality of individual pieces of evidence, it serves the purpose of corroboration (and not merely repetition). But quantity also leads to time-and information-management problems that
should not be underestimated. This Chapter does not come up with new evidentiary rules allowing to better deal with the tremendous amount of information relevant in the prosecutions of international crimes. Instead, it mainly illustrates the point that the search for procedural solutions that may prove effective in international crimes cases both at the international and national level should proceed from the systematic review of the unique characteristics of international crimes. Such review will also be indispensable for identifying the problems intrinsic in core crimes prosecutions and the extent to which the available solutions provide an adequate response to those problems. Hence, it could be useful for any investigation, prosecution and adjudication of international crimes, whether conducted by an international criminal tribunal, a hybrid court, or a domestic court. Essentially, the Chapter suggests a change of perspective on the law of evidence and advocates for a different methodology that focuses on the crime, not the court.
All courts are likely to encounter the same evidentiary challenges if these are inherent to the type of crime. Forum-neutral solutions may be the answer. In addition to the horizontal harmonization of international criminal law and procedure at the international level that has led to much scholarship on the sui generis nature of these bodies of law, vertical harmonization across the national-international divide will occur if one assumes that the type of crime is in fact the binding, overarching factor. While national courts can learn from the best practices developed by international courts and tribunals, any harmonization in accordance with the type of crime, i.e. vertical harmonization, will also lead to collateral, horizontal pluralism within any given national system. In respect of justice for international crimes, pluralism and harmonization are in fact mutually inclusive phenomena.
In any event, the effect of the typical features of international crimes on principles or rules of evidence should be left to a minimum, the pursuance of additional goals at the microlevel is better avoided, and the temptation to downgrade the presumption of innocence should be resisted. Such tendencies would defy the purpose of international criminal justice as '[i]t would indeed be a disheartening irony if a justice system, designed to contribute to the protection of human rights, could properly function only by disregarding humanistic values'. 106 This would lead to legal fictions and trials of preferred outcomes, in which case we would be getting as lost in our ideology of fighting impunity, as many of the perpetrators of international crimes got lost in theirs.
